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Sommaire – L’impact du mouvement souverainiste sur des indicateurs économique du Québec 
1961-2010 
Depuis la création du Parti québécois (PQ), à la fin des années 60, la question de l’indépendance du 
Québec est au cœur des débats politiques. Cette question touche une corde sensible chez plusieurs 
Québécois ce qui fait en sorte que les débats sont généralement teintés par des opinions et des 
anecdotes plutôt que par des faits tangibles. Les fédéralistes attribuent la faible performance économique 
du Québec par rapport à celle du reste du Canada, et plus particulièrement de l’Ontario, au PQ et à 
l’incertitude face à l’avenir du Québec qu’il génèrerait; argument que les souverainistes réfutent. La 
présente étude fait appel à la modélisation économétrique pour étudier l’impact de l’incertitude politique, 
représentée par la présence du PQ au pouvoir ou par un indice de support pour la souveraineté, sur le 
PIB, le taux d’emploi, l’investissement et les flux de migration interprovinciale. Les résultats obtenus 
grâce à des estimations par moindres carrés ordinaires et par la méthode de Prais-Winsten nous 
permettent de conclure que l’instabilité politique, modélisée des deux manières énumérées 
précédemment, n’a pas eu d’impact, ni négatif, ni positif, sur les niveaux de PIB per capita, d’emplois et 
d’investissements per capita. De plus, nous pouvons affirmer que l’élection d’un gouvernement péquiste 
et une hausse du support pour la souveraineté ont eu un impact négatif sur le solde migratoire 
interprovincial net du Québec. En effet, la présence du PQ au pouvoir ou une hausse du support pour la 
souveraineté est responsable du départ de milliers de Québécois au fil des ans. 
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Introduction 
Since the creation of the Parti Québécois (PQ), in the late 1960s, political debates in Quebec have 
consistently involved the issue of the province’s independence from Canada. Indeed, the question of 
Quebec’s sovereignty is a sensitive one, and debates surrounding the issue often rely on opinions and 
anecdotes rather than hard facts. Federalists tend to attribute Quebec’s supposed poor economic 
performance relatively to the Rest of Canada and especially Ontario to political instability allegedly 
generated by the PQ; while Sovereigntists strongly refute this argument. Moreover, a large proportion of 
Quebecers are thought to have left the province in the 70s and 80s as a result of the political uncertainty 
surrounding the first referendum on Quebec’s sovereignty. The impact of the Sovereigntist movement 
would hence spread further than standard economic indicators and change the fabric of Quebec’s 
society. 
With this paper, we will examine whether political uncertainty has had a negative impact on the economy 
of the Province of Quebec over the 1961-2010 period. Our analysis will rely on the econometric modelling 
of a set of three economic indicators, namely gross domestic product (GDP), employment and 
investment. We will also look at the impact of political instability on Quebec’s net interprovincial migration 
flows. 
This study is divided in three main sections. A brief overview of the history of the Quebec Sovereigntist 
movement and a review of the literature are provided in the first section. The data and econometric 
models are introduced in the second section and results and analysis are in the third section. A 
conclusion follows. 
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1. Analytical Framework 
1.1 Historical Background 
Even though several independence movements have helped shape Quebec’s history since the conquest 
of New France, it was not until the 1960s that the issue of independence became a tangible idea for 
Quebecers (Noël, s.d.). The creation of the Sovereigntist movement in its contemporary form can be 
traced back to the Quiet Revolution, in the 1960s, and the ensuing formation of Sovereigntist political 
parties. The Alliance Laurentienne, founded in 1957, was one of the first groups advocating for the 
independence of the province through the creation of a new state. Then, followed many others amongst 
which are the Rassemblement pour l’indépendance nationale (RIN) and the Ralliement National (RN), the 
first political parties to run for office under a Sovereigntist banner in a provincial election, in 1966, and the 
Parti Québécois (PQ) born from a merger between the RN and René Lévesque’s Mouvement 
Souveraineté-Association, in 1968 while the RIN dissolved itself. Sovereigntists garnered negative 
attention when the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), an extremist faction, triggered the October 
Crisis, in 1970, by kidnapping and killing a Quebec government minister. The reaction of the population of 
Québec to this act led to the end of this kind of violence. 
Seen as a moderate, former Liberal minister, René Lévesque was able to rally a large number of 
Quebecers in support of sovereignty. The PQ was elected with 41% of the vote for the first time in the 
November 1976 election (DGEQ, 2013). In its first mandate, from 1976 to 1981, the PQ adopted 
nationalist policies such as the Charter of the French Language, commonly called Bill 101, which 
instituted French as the official language of the province and the language of work. This facilitated access 
to management positions for native French speakers whereas those jobs were historically occupied by 
Montrealers, native-English-speaking Quebecers mainly concentrated in the Montreal area. 
The first referendum on Quebec sovereignty was held in May 1980. The “Yes” was defeated by 60% of 
the vote (DGEQ, 2013). Following the opposition to the amending of the Canadian Constitution, the 
Charlottetown Accord and the Meech Lake Accord, Sovereigntists attracted more sympathizers. A 
second referendum on sovereignty was held in 1995. Independence was rejected once again, but with a 
much smaller margin, 51%, this time (DGEQ, 2013). Both referendums called for sovereignty-association, 
the independence of the Province of Quebec coupled with a partnership with the Canadian federal 
government. Debates over sovereignty surface every time a provincial election is held in Quebec; this is 
what is thought to be at the heart of the alleged political uncertainty in the province. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
Most studies on the impact of the independence movement on Quebec’s economy were written in the 
90s, when support for the Sovereigntist movement was at its highest in polls. Since the defeat of the 
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“Yes” in the 1995 referendum, the question of Quebec’s independence has surfaced several times, but 
never to the point where it spurred debates as heated as before the second referendum. Existing studies 
express diverse opinions on the impacts of political instability caused by the eventuality of secession, but 
apart from Altug, Demers and Demers (2007) none rely on solid econometric evidence. This being said, 
two hypotheses prevail: political instability is harmful, especially because of the loss of jobs due to major 
companies leaving the province, a high risk premium on government borrowing, a decrease in 
investments and a high debt level; or there is no clear relation between political instability and Quebec’s 
economic performance. 
Supporting the first hypothesis, McCallum and Green (1991) paint a bleak picture of Quebec’s economy 
since the birth of the Parti Québécois. In Parting as Friends: The Economic Consequences for Quebec, 
the authors argue that the Sovereigntist movement is responsible for the migration from Montreal to 
Toronto of many corporations and head offices which caused an increase in the relative unemployment 
rate between the two cities. In addition, sovereignty would induce higher borrowing costs for the Quebec 
government as there would be a higher risk premium on provincial government bonds. All in all, 
McCallum and Green conclude, “a failure to resolve Canada’s constitutional crisis would be very bad for 
the Quebec economy and for the economic well-being of many Quebecers.” The econometric analysis 
leading to those results is not included in the paper. 
Invited to comment on McCallum’s and Green’s study, Vaillancourt finds the evidence evoked to 
demonstrate the PQ’s negative influence on the province’s economic indicators for the 1976-1985 period 
to be “weak.” In fact, Vaillancourt notes that this period was marked by “a significant improvement in the 
socio-economic status of Francophones with respect to Anglophones.” 
Similarly to McCallum and Green, Grady (1991) argues that political uncertainty is responsible for a 
decrease in Quebec’s level of investment per capita compared to Ontario’s. By seceding from Canada, 
Quebec’s net public debt would incur a substantial increase – in part because it would “receive” its share 
of the federal debt – which would make it a “high public debt country.” This would have a deterrent effect 
on lenders and would prompt a higher interest premium. Once again, there is no indication of quantitative 
work sustaining the author’s conclusions. 
In “Political Risk and Irreversible Investment” (2007), Altug, Demers and Demers delve deeper to 
demonstrate the harmful effect of the Sovereignist movement on investment levels in Quebec. In their 
study of Quebec’s economy, the authors use a simulation model to examine the reaction of the 
investment-capital stock ratio in machinery and equipment for major sectors of the economy, namely the 
manufacturing industries, business sector and total industries, during the 1990s. Altug et al. compare 
data for two periods thought to represent political stability, from 1981 to 1989, and political risk, from 1990 
to 1998, for both Quebec and Ontario. Levels of investment per worker in Quebec fell by 18% on average 
over the 1990-1998 interval relatively to the previous period, deemed as politically stable. The authors 
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find that “political risk affects the firm’s investment decisions regardless of the party in power.” In fact, as 
McCallum and Green (1991) and Grady (1991) hint at, expectations of higher interest rates or higher risk 
premia are “important channel[s] through which political risk must have made its effect [on Quebec’s 
economy].” 
Stewart (2012) offers a more nuanced analysis by looking back at the events that shaped Quebec’s 
economy before the PQ first came to power. According to him, several “adverse trends,” such as the 
“historical shift from rail and sea transport toward trucking, and the general westward movement of 
Canadian industrial activity,” were already affecting Quebec’s economic performance since the 1940s. 
Moreover, the author claims that “political uncertainty” was as much a determinant factor of the size of 
the government’s debt risk premium as the debt load itself. Stewart notes that “investor nervousness” 
was triggered by the PQ’s win in the 1994 election. All in all, political instability would be responsible for 
no more than a 5% decrease in total investment. 
Kollenz (2000) offers the closest analysis to what is sought with this paper. Relying on graphical 
evidence, the author attempts to establish “a correlation between political events, which could cause 
uncertainty, and socio-economic developments, which could stem from political instability.” In order to do 
so, Quebec’s economic indicators are compared to Ontario’s and Canada’s to identify trends and 
deviations from these trends. Kollenz uses four data categories, namely GDP, investment, consumption 
and employment, starting in 1961. Opinion polls commissioned by the Conseil du Patronat du Québec as 
well as newspapers articles provide the data for Quebecers’ and outsiders’ perception of the political 
climate in the province. No direct relation is found between the advent of the Sovereigntist movement and 
Quebec’s economic performance. Rather, the author asserts that migration and language policies were 
major determinants of the province’s development. Kollenz’s findings can be summarized as follow: 
-The widening gap between Quebec’s and Ontario’s GDP comes from capital accumulation, not from 
slower growth rates in Quebec. 
-A causal relationship between lower level of investment in Quebec after the 1995 referendum and 
political instability seems likely. However, the effects of political instability “are not strong enough to 
be provable.” 
-Quebec’s economic structure is more to blame than the PQ for higher unemployment rates. 
 
In parallel with the exodus of corporate head offices from Montreal to Toronto, political instability is also 
thought to be responsible for the out-migration of a great number of Quebecers, especially towards 
Ontario. Vachon and Vaillancourt (1998) find that interprovincial migration has decreased by one third in 
Canada over the 1971-1996 period. However, the national trend appears to have been obscured by 
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strong provincial trends such as the massive out-migration of Quebec-born migrants following the 
election of the PQ in 1976. Quebec lost approximately 8% of its population, compared to a basis scenario 
for which interprovincial flows are null, between 1961 and 1996, and is found to be one of the main losers 
of interprovincial migration flows. Ontario is a net gainer with its in-migration peaking in the years 1969 to 
1971, largely because of Quebec’s out-migration. The authors note that Ontario is the most popular 
destination for Quebec-born migrants. Age and education come out as the factors most likely to prompt 
Canadians to move from one province to another. Quebec’s bilingual Anglophones are also found to form 
the most mobile group. 
 
2. Data and Method 
Our analysis of the impact of political uncertainty on Quebec’s economic situation is twofold. Firstly, we 
seek to add to prior studies by establishing, through econometric analysis, if there exists a clear link 
between political instability and main economic indicators, namely GDP, employment and investment. 
Secondly, we seek to confirm (infirm) whether the massive out-migration episodes encountered during 
periods of apparent high support for sovereignty, as shown by poll results, were indeed caused by a fear 
of secession. 
For the first part of the analysis, equations are built in levels to control for the economic environment, i.e. 
Quebec data is divided by Ontario data for all variables. In doing so, we measure the evolution of 
Quebec’s economic aggregates compared to Ontario’s, which partly removes the fluctuations stemming 
from outside shocks, either from the Canadian or international economies. Ontario is chosen as a point of 
comparison because it is the province closest to Quebec in terms of composition of economic activity, 
GDP, population and size. It can be argued that Ontario’s economic indicators are also possibly 
negatively affected by the political instability caused by the Parti Québécois. In this sense, Ontario would 
not be an accurate comparison point. However, based on the literature cited above, Ontario would benefit 
from Quebec’s misfortunes as firms, jobs and workers would move from the latter to the former. 
Consequently, the effect on Ontario’s economy would be positive rather than negative, as is thought to be 
the case with Quebec, and the gap between the two provinces would widen even further. Variables are 
either expressed in percentages or per capita to remove the effect of the size of the population. The 
series come from Statistics Canada’s CANSIM database and span 45 years, from 1966 to 2010. All 
series expressed in dollars are converted in real dollars of 1992 with the Canadian consumer price index 
(CPI) because provincial CPIs are not available for the whole period covered. Relevant provincial data 
was unavailable for prior years. 
In the second part of this study, we look at the impact of political uncertainty on interprovincial migration 
flows to and from the Province of Quebec. The series span 50 years, from 1961 to 2010, and are built 
using CANSIM, Canadian censuses and Labour Force Surveys. Relevant series are expressed in dollars 
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of 1992. All data series used for modelling GDP, employment, investment and interprovincial migration 
are included in appendix Table A1 and sources are given in Table A2. 
In both cases, political instability is modelled with two distinct proxies. Dummy_PQt is a dichotomic 
variable equal to 1 for the years for which the Parti Québécois formed the government for more than six 
months and 0 otherwise. There are two periods for which Dummy_PQt equals 1, from 1977 to 1985 and 
1995 to 2002. Dummy_PQt comprises of the years preceding and following the two referendums (1980 
and 1995), which possibly reflect the episodes of buildup and aftermath of both referendums. The second 
proxy, Index_PQt, is an index reflecting Quebecers’ support for sovereignty based on survey results 
compiled by Claire Durand and the Quebec Inter-University Centre for Social Statistics. The questions 
asked were not textually identical for all surveys but equally sought to measure the percentage of the 
population in favour of Quebec’s secession from Canada. For the years for which more than one result is 
available, Index_PQt is given by the simple average of those results. The index for the years with no data 
available is given by the average of the results for the preceding and following years. Since support for 
sovereignty was stagnant for the last years of the sample, we suppose that support for sovereignty in 
2009 and 2010 was the same as in 2008. The evolution of the Parti Québécois sovereignty support index 
is presented in Figure 1 with the exact data available in appendix Table A1. 
 
Figure 1 – Evolution of the support for sovereignty index (in %), 1961-2010 
 
Source: Quebec Inter-University Centre for Social Statistics 
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2.1 Gross Domestic Product 
Even though GDP is not systematically mentioned in the literature as one of the economic indicators 
possibly suffering from political instability, it is reasonable to believe that, if the Sovereigntist movement 
has a negative impact on employment and investment, GDP is also likely to react negatively. Since 1966, 
Quebec’s GDP per capita has followed an upward trend with some slumps in the early ‘80s and ‘90s 
(Figure 2). Ontario’s GDP per capita stands above Quebec’s for the whole period and seems to follow 
similar trends. By looking at the evolution of the difference between the two provinces (Figure 3), it is not 
clear whether Ontario has systematically fared better than Quebec, thus deepening the gap as suggested 
in the literature. In fact, the difference in GDP per capita between the provinces is about the same in 
1966 and 2010. In addition, at 3,908$, the difference is at its lowest in 1980, a referendum year. Massive 
investments had taken place in Quebec in the previous years, notably the James Bay Project and 
Montreal Olympics, which can partly explain the catching up by the Province of Quebec. At its widest, the 
gap is almost twice that, at 6,922$, nine years later. 
 
Figure 2 - Quebec and Ontario GDP per capita (in real dollars of 1992), 1966-2010 
 
Sources: GDP: CANSIM 384-0035 (1966-1980), 384-0001 (1981-2010); 
total population: 051-0026 (1966-1970), 051-0001 (1971-2010) 
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Figure 3 – Difference in GDP per capita between Ontario and Quebec (in real dollars of 1992), 1966-
2010 
 
Sources: GDP: CANSIM 384-0035 (1966-1980), 384-0001 (1981-2010); 
total population: 051-0026 (1966-1970), 051-0001 (1971-2010) 
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converted in real dollars of 1992. Observations were recorded for each year, hence there are 45 
observations. 
 
2.2 Employment 
We look at employment rather than unemployment to avoid leaving out discouraged jobless workers who 
have left the labour force. Our conclusions might thus differ from McCallum and Green (1991). The 
employment rate in Quebec has gradually increased from 58%, its 1966 level, to culminate at 72% in 
2008 (Figure 3). In Ontario, employment seems to have followed a similar trend, but the drop occurring in 
the early ‘90s was deeper and the ensuing recovery slower. Graphical evidence shows that employment 
rates for the two provinces have converged over the 1966-2010 period. Appendix Figure A1 shows the 
evolution of the gap between the two provinces. Interestingly, the gap widens all the way to the mid-‘80s. 
The massive job creation spurred by the James Bay Project in the ‘70s, amongst others, was not 
sufficient to overshadow the relative ongoing decline of employment figures in Quebec. On average, the 
employment rate was higher in Ontario than in Quebec, respectively at 70% and 63%. 
 
Figure 3 – Employment rates in Quebec and Ontario (in %), 1966-2010 
 
Sources: employment: CANSIM 384-0035 (1966-1975), 282-0002 (1976-
2010); population 15-64: 051-0026 (1966-1970), 051-0001 (1971-2010) 
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To estimate the employment equation, we rely on the work of Lesueur (1992) according to which 
employment is a function of employment at the previous period and GDP. We estimate a logarithmic 
equation corresponding to: 
ln(EmploymentQCt/EmploymentONt) = a + b*ln(EmploymentQCt-1/EmploymentONt-1) + 
c*ln(GDPQCt/GDPONt) + d*PQt + et 
Variables are defined as for the GDP equation. There are 45 observations. 
 
2.3 Investment 
The measure of investment used here only takes into account private non-residential investments and 
leaves out public and residential investments, which, respectively, depend on government and household 
decisions rather than business choices. Private non-residential investments are thought to be more 
mobile and give a better indication of investors’ confidence. It is important to note that Crown 
corporations’ investments, such as Hydro-Québec’s, are included in private non-residential investments 
and are hence accounted for in our data. 
Figure 4 shows much more volatility than for previous economic indicators, with investment levels at 
times higher in Quebec (in particular from 1975 to 1980), at times higher in Ontario (especially 1983-
1993). Average investment per capita levels are pretty close, with 911$ in Quebec and 968$ in Ontario. 
As mentioned previously, Quebec’s investment peak occurs in 1975, the year following the launch of the 
James Bay Project. Contrarily to what is stated by McCallum and Green (1991) and Grady (1991), 
investment follows the same general trends in both provinces. There is no opposite movement in 
Quebec’s and Ontario’s investment levels due to the departure of firms from Montreal to Toronto or to a 
loss of investors’ confidence imputed to political instability. 
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Figure 4 – Investment per capita in Quebec and Ontario (in real dollars of 1992), 1966-2010 
 
Sources: investment: CANSIM 384-0015 (1966-1980), 384-0002 (1981-
2010); total population: 051-0026 (1966-1970), 051-0001 (1971-2010) 
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Where: 
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BenefitsQCt-1/BenefitsONt-1: Quebec corporations’ net benefits per capita at the previous period on that of 
Ontario; 
GDPQCt/GDPONt and PQt: as defined previously. 
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dollars of 1992. The data for direct corporate taxes both in Quebec and Ontario was not available for the 
last year of our sample. There are 44 observations for this series. 
 
2.4 Migration 
As indicated in Vachon and Vaillancourt (1998), graphical evidence shows that Quebec has been a net 
loser in terms of interprovincial migration flows since 1963. The most important out-migration episodes 
occurred in 1970 and between the years 1976 and 1983. Interestingly, these years marked turning points 
for the Sovereigntist movement with the October Crisis, in 1970, and the adoption of nationalist policies 
such as Bill 101, in 1977, by a Parti Québécois government. 
 
Figure 5 – Net interprovincial migration flows in Quebec, 1961-2010 
 
Sources: CANSIM 051-0017 
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Migrationt = a+ b*(EmploymentQCt/EmploymentONt) + c*(EarningsQCt/EarningsONt) + d*Anglot + e*Allot 
+ g*Official_languagest + h*PQt + it 
Where: 
Migrationt: Net migration flows to Quebec; 
EarningsQCt/EarningsONt: ratio of Quebec average weekly household income on that of Ontario; 
Anglot: Percentage of Quebec’s population having English as a mother tongue; 
Allot: Percentage of Quebec’s population having neither French nor English as a mother tongue; 
Official_languagest: Percentage of Quebec’s population speaking both official languages; 
EmploymentQCt/EmploymentONt and PQt: as defined previously. 
 
Some manipulations are required to build the database for assessing the impact of the PQ on 
interprovincial migration. This series contains 50 observations with the data spanning 1961 to 2010. Net 
migration figures are obtained by subtracting the number of out-migrants from the number of in-migrants. 
This data is not available for the two first quarters of 1961. In supposing that migration figures are the 
same for the first and the second semester, we obtain a yearly figure by deducting the outflows from the 
inflows for the last two quarters and doubling that number. Employment data for 1961 to 1965 is found in 
the Labour Force Survey published yearly by Statistics Canada. We use figures for the month of July 
each year. Employment figures for 1966 to 2010 and average weekly household incomes for the whole 
sample come from CANSIM. The proportions of Anglophones and Allophones are available in Statistics 
Canada censuses every five years starting in 1971 and ending in 2006. Mother tongue figures are not 
available for 1961, but knowledge of official language is. Consequently, mother tongue figures are 
obtained by calculating the proportion of Quebecers speaking French only, English only and neither 
French nor English, and, for each linguistic group, multiplying the number of Quebecers speaking both 
official languages by the corresponding proportion and, respectively, adding it to the number of unilingual 
Francophones, unilingual Anglophones and Allophones speaking neither French nor English. For the 
years in between censuses, data is smoothed. Extrapolations complete the last four years of the sample. 
Official languages figures are smoothed following the same method. The series for average weekly 
earnings including overtime, all categories of employment combined, is built using three CANSIM series. 
Data is available for the years 1991-2010, 1983-2000 and 1961-1985. We construct a conversion factor 
by taking the ratio of the most recent data on the least recent for the years overlapping two series. Data 
series are integrated by multiplying least recent figures by this conversion factor. 
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3. Results and Analysis 
Most Advanced Dickey-Fuller stationarity (ADF) tests conducted on our different variables indicate the 
presence of unit roots. However, these results need to be put into perspective as stationary processes 
and unit roots are thought to be very hard to distinguish in finite samples, especially in small samples like 
ours (Cochrane, 1991). Moreover, using ratios, like we do for the GDP, employment and investment 
regressions, should remove non-stationarity, if there is any, from these variables. Nevertheless, we also 
estimate the regressions in first differences to compare with results obtained when no corrections are 
made. Thereby, we estimate the three main regressions introduced in the previous section with variables 
expressed either in levels or in first differences, and using either one of our two proxies for political 
instability. 
 
3.1 GDP 
Usual tests reveal the presence of first-order autocorrelation according to the Scwharz’s Bayesian 
information criterion (SBIC) as well as heteroskedasticity in equation 1. We also test for cointegration 
following the Engle-Granger two-step method which requires running additional ADF tests on equations’ 
1 and 2 residuals. Because non-stationarity is detected in all independent variables and residuals are 
also found to be non-stationary, we conclude to the absence of cointegration. We do not rely on a 
Johansen test because our sample is too small to return reliable results. 
In addition, graphic analysis of the dependent variable shows a linear upward trend with a possible break 
for the years 1974 to 1984. A Chow test confirms a break in the trend for those years. We generate a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for the years between 1974 and 1984 and 0 for the rest to account for this 
break. Dummybreak1t is included as a regressor in equations 3 and 4, for which variables are in levels 
and PQt is given by Dummy_PQt or Index_PQt. The equations are estimated using robust standard errors 
because of heteroskedasticity. 
The two main equations are estimated twice: once using robust OLS estimators to correct for 
heteroskedasticity, when necessary, and once using Prais-Winsten estimators to eliminate 
autocorrelation. Results are found in Table 1. Estimated equations are as follow: 
-Equation 1: Robust OLS in levels, PQt = Dummy_PQt; 
-Equation 2: OLS in levels, PQt = Index_PQt; 
-Equation 3: Robust OLS in levels, PQt = Dummy_PQt, with Dummybreak1t; 
-Equation 4: Robust OLS in levels, PQt = Index_PQt, with Dummybreak1t; 
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-Equation 5: Robust Prais-Winsten estimators (PWE) in levels, PQt = Dummy_PQt; 
-Equation 6: PWE in levels, PQt = Index_PQt. 
 
As discussed in the introduction for this section, tests to detect unit roots may not be reliable because of 
the size of the sample. In this sense, equations in first differences are not the preferred options (results 
available in appendix Table A3). In both cases, all variables are found to be not statistically significantly 
different from 0 at a confidence level of 5%. R
2
 values are low, at 0.08 and 0.12, and denote a poor fit of 
the regressions. 
Equations 3 and 4 include a dummy variable to account for an apparent break in lnGDPt for the years 
1974 to 1984. It should be noted that these years correspond to the first election of a Parti Québécois 
government, in 1976, and the first referendum, in 1980. Moreover, the 1974-1984 period sees the ratio of 
employment between Quebec and Ontario fall and reach its lowest level for the whole sample at 84%, in 
1982. Meanwhile, support for sovereignty steadily increases up to the 1980 referendum and falls 
thereafter. Including Dummybreak1t as a regressor removes ten observations out of the 45 observation 
sample. Because it takes away what can be considered as crucial years for the independence 
movement, Dummybreak1t could be responsible for diverting some of the PQ variables impact. Out of the 
six equations, equations 3 and 4 return the best fit with R
2
 values of 0.86 and 0.87. All coefficients are 
found to be statistically significant except for Dummy_PQt, in equation 3. lnEmploymentt and lnCapitalt 
have expected positive signs. Interestingly, equation 4 is the only instance for which a political instability 
proxy, Index_PQt, is statistically significant at a 5% level. However, it does not have the expected sign. 
Equations 1 and 2 estimated with OLS estimators exhibit a good fit for our model with R
2
 values of 0.73 
and 0.72. In both cases, lnEmploymentt and lnCapitalt coefficients are statistically significant and take 
expected positive signs. In equation 1, a 1% increase in the employment ratio, i.e. an improvement in the 
Quebec-to-Ontario figures, would lead to a 0.30% increase in the GDP ratio. Similarly, a 1% increase in 
the capital ratio would lead to a 0.40% increase in the GDP ratio. In equation 2, figures are similar with an 
elasticity of 0.24% for the employment ratio and 0.45% for the capital ratio. With p-values above 19%, 
Dummy_PQt and Index_PQt are not found to be statistically significantly different from zero. Results are 
similar when using Prais-Winsten estimators to correct for first-order autocorrelation, except for 
lnEmploymentt which is found to be not significant in both equations 5 and 6. Therefore, we cannot 
conclude that political instability has an impact on Quebec’s GDP. 
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Table 1 – Explanatory factors for the Quebec-Ontario GDP ratio, 1966-2010, different methodologies 
Independent 
variable 
Equation 1 
(Robust 
OLS level) 
Equation 2 
(OLS level) 
Equation 3 
(Robust 
OLS level) 
Equation 4 
(Robust 
OLS level) 
Equation 5 
(PWE level) 
Equation 6 
(PWE level) 
lnEmploymentt 
0.298* 
(0.005) 
0.235* 
(0.009) 
0.494* 
(0.000) 
0.498* 
(0.000) 
0.169 
(0.301) 
0.152 
(0.321) 
lnCapitalt 
0.395* 
(0.000) 
0.451* 
(0.000) 
0.378* 
(0.000) 
0.262* 
(0.000) 
0.492* 
(0.015) 
0.462* 
(0.020) 
Dummy_PQt 
0.011 
(0.191) 
 
-0.001 
(0.802) 
 
-0.004 
(0.582) 
 
Index_PQt  
-0.000 
(0.920) 
 
0.001* 
(0.028) 
 
0.001 
(0.163) 
Dummybreak1t   
0.040* 
(0.000) 
0.044* 
(0.000) 
  
R
2 
0.73 0.72 0.86 0.87 0.24 0.25 
Notes: N=45; 
P-values are in parenthesis below the estimated coefficients; 
 *Significant coefficients at a 5% confidence level. 
 
3.2 Employment 
Usual tests invalidate the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. We test for cointegration by 
running ADF tests on the residuals of the regression. Residuals are stationary whether Dummy_PQt or 
Index_PQt is used. Therefore, there would be cointegration in the two main equations were 
lnEmploymentt and lnGDPt truly non-stationary. In this event, we would not be able to tell in which 
direction the causal relation between support for sovereignty and employment goes. All equations are 
estimated without using robust standard errors as no heteroskedasticity is found. 
When graphing the logarithm of the employment ratio, the curve appears “v shaped”, with its lowest point 
occurring in 1982. A Chow test confirms a break in the trend for this year. However, we can hardly justify 
including a dummy-break variable, especially as it would affect almost half of the sample. In the same 
vein, we choose not to include a trend variable as a regressor to remove an apparent linear trend in the 
data after 1982. 
All results are given in Table 2. The following equations are estimated: 
-Equation 1: OLS in levels, PQt = Dummy_PQt; 
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-Equation 2: OLS in levels, PQt = Index_PQt; 
-Equation 3: OLS in first differences, PQt = Dummy_PQt; 
-Equation 4: OLS in first differences, PQt = Index_PQt. 
 
Equations 1 and 2 exhibit a very good fit with similar R
2
 values of 0.94. Only lnEmploymentt-1 is 
statistically significant at a 5% confidence level. A 1% increase in the first lag of the employment ratio 
produces either a 0.98% or 1.01% increase in the employment ratio whether Dummy_PQt or Index_PQt 
respectively stand for political instability. According to this model, the only determinant of the employment 
ratio at the current period is the employment ratio at the previous period. Equations in first differences, 
equations 3 and 4, have extremely low R
2
 and all coefficients are found to be not statistically significantly 
different from 0. 
As discussed previously, this model is one of few empirical models that relate employment and economic 
output. A Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) confirms that equations 1 and 
2 are properly specified, i.e. there are no omitted variables. Our results demonstrate that political 
instability does not have a direct impact on employment. This is in line with graphical evidence that shows 
the employment ratio to be fairly stable, around 0.9, for the most part of the sample (appendix Figure A2). 
 
Table 2 – Explanatory factors for the Quebec-Ontario employment ratio, 1966-2009, different 
methodologies 
Independent variable 
Equation 1 
(OLS level) 
Equation 2 
(OLS level) 
Equation 3 
(OLS 1
st
 diff) 
Equation 4 
(OLS 1
st
 diff) 
lnEmploymentt-1 
0.977* 
(0.000) 
1.010* 
(0.000) 
-0.080 
(0.623) 
-0.075 
(0.646) 
lnGDPt 
0.092 
(0.122) 
-0.006 
(0.932) 
0.093 
(0.501) 
0.094 
(0.505) 
Dummy_PQt 
-0.005 
(0.238) 
 
-0.002 
(0.786) 
 
Index_PQt  
0.007 
(0.126) 
 
-0.000 
(0.961) 
R
2 
0.94 0.94 0.88 0.90 
Notes: N=45; 
P-values are in parenthesis below the estimated coefficients; 
 *Significant coefficients at a 5% confidence level. 
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3.3 Investment 
Investment data also exhibits first-order autocorrelation as suggested by the SBIC. Heteroskedasticity is 
found in equation 2, which makes it the only regression to be estimated with robust standard errors. ADF 
tests reveal the presence of unit roots in residuals for equations 1 and 2, which means that there is no 
cointegration, notwithstanding whether there truly is non-stationarity in lnInvestmentt and lnGDPt-1. In 
equations 3 and 4, Prais-Winsten estimators are used to eliminate autocorrelation. Equations with 
variables in first differences are also estimated (results given in appendix Table A4). It is worth 
mentioning that, in this case, lnBenefitst-1 is not in first differences because it is stationary. Estimated 
regressions are found in table 3. Equations are as follow: 
-Equation 1: OLS in levels, PQt = Dummy_PQt; 
-Equation 2: Robust OLS in levels, PQt = Index_PQt; 
-Equation 3: PWE in levels, PQt = Dummy_PQt; 
-Equation 4: Robust PWE in levels, PQt = Index_PQt. 
 
In both equations 1 and 2, lnGDPt-1 is the only variable that is found to be significantly statistically 
different from 0. The GDP ratio elasticity is 3.7%, should Dummy_PQt or Index_PQt be used as the 
political instability indicator. A Ramsey RESET test shows these equations to be properly specified. 
Equations exhibit a good fit with R
2
 values of 0.49. Equations using Prais-Winsten estimators have lower 
R
2
 values, at 0.25. Results are similar except for lnBenefitst-1 which is found to be significant in equation 
4. However, it does not have the expected positive sign. As for previous indicators, we do not rely on 
equations in first differences to draw conclusions. 
Even though investment was identified in the literature as the variable most likely to be affected by 
political instability, we cannot confirm this assertion based on our results. In all the equations, 
Dummy_PQt and Index_PQt are both not statistically significant with p-values above 70%. As noted by 
Stewart (2012), major changes were already underway in Quebec’s economic fabric when the PQ first 
came to power and those transformations appear to have been supported successively by Federalist and 
Sovereigntist governments. 
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Table 3 – Explanatory factors for the Quebec-Ontario investment ratio, 1966-2010, different 
methodologies 
Independent variable 
Equation 1 
(OLS level) 
Equation 2 
(Robust OLS 
level) 
Equation 3 
(PWE level) 
Equation 4 
(Robust PWE 
level) 
lnBenefitst-1 
-0.031 
(0.900) 
-0.070 
(0.732) 
-0.314 
(0.081) 
-0.316* 
(0.043) 
lnGDPt-1 
3.700* 
(0.000) 
3.690* 
(0.000) 
3.082* 
(0.004) 
3.070* 
(0.006) 
Dummy_PQt 
-0.019 
(0.721) 
 
-0.002 
(0.971) 
 
Index_PQt  
-0.001 
(0.805) 
 
0.000 
(0.960) 
R
2 
0.49 0.49 0.25 0.25 
Notes: N=44; 
P-values are in parenthesis below the estimated coefficients; 
 *Significant coefficients at a 5% confidence level. 
 
3.4 Migration 
Our study of interprovincial migration relies on a linear model estimated with employment and income 
variables expressed in levels and demographic variables, namely Francot, Anglot, Allot and 
Official_languagest, expressed in percentages. We take the proportion of native French speakers as our 
reference point in order to avoid multicolinearity with Anglot and Allot. We use Francot as the basis, rather 
than Anglot, because it is wider; it encompasses over three quarters of the Quebec population. In fact, the 
proportion of Francophones roughly stays around 77% for the whole sample. The greatest variations 
happen in the proportion of Anglophones and Allophones. As mentioned previously, the number of 
English native speakers shrinks while Allophones become more numerous and fill the gap (Figure 6). 
A Ramsey RESET test confirms the proper specification of the model when estimated with OLS at a 5% 
confidence level when Dummy_PQt is included, but not when Index_PQt is. We also estimate regressions 
omitting Official_languagest as one of the demographic characteristic independent variables. ADF tests 
reveal the presence of unit roots in all series. We choose not to estimate regressions in first differences 
because the interpretation would not be relevant. Following the two-step Engle-Granger method, we find 
cointegration in equations 1 and 2, i.e. it is not clear whether the independent variable causes the 
dependent variable or vice versa. Because non-stationarity seems plausible in variables such as Anglot, 
Allot and Official_languagest, we accept the possibility of cointegration. Moreover, we denote first-order 
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autocorrelation in Migrationt. In this light, we estimate our equations both with robust-OLS estimators and 
autocorrelation-robust Prais-Winsten estimators. The following regressions are estimated: 
-Equation 1: Robust OLS in levels, PQt = Dummy_PQt; 
-Equation 2: Robust OLS in levels, PQt = Index_PQt; 
-Equation 3: Robust OLS in levels, PQt = Dummy_PQt, without Official_languagest; 
-Equation 4: Robust OLS in levels, PQt = Index_PQt, without Official_languagest; 
-Equation 5: Robust PWE in levels, PQt = Dummy_PQt; 
-Equation 6: Robust PWE in levels, PQt = Index_PQt. 
 
Interestingly, relative average weekly income, Earningst, is not statistically significant in all of the 
regressions. We expected the prospect of higher revenues to have an attractive effect, but it does not 
appear to be the case. Employmentt is significant in all four equations and takes the expected positive 
sign. As noted by Cousineau and Vaillancourt (2001), “workers move from the low-wage and low-
employment region to the high-wage and high-employment region.” Consequently, it is reasonable to 
believe that Quebecers move westward seeking job opportunities. 
When looking at the demographic characteristics of the Quebec population, we notice that Anglot and 
Allot coefficients are significant at a 5% confidence level in all the equations except for equation 5 where 
Anglot is significant at 10%. As expected they have a negative sign, meaning that a higher percentage of 
native English speakers or Allophones within Quebec’s population increases migration outflows. 
Official_languagest is not significant in any case. We thought that a higher proportion of bilingual people 
in Quebec might be related to larger interprovincial migration outflows than inflows. However, this might 
also be indicative of greater bilingualism amongst the Quebec Francophone population. In fact, the 
proportion of Quebecers speaking both official languages has steadily gone up from 25%, in 1961, to 
41%, in 2010 (Figure 7) at the same time as the proportion of Anglophones has shrunk by half, from 14% 
to 7% (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6 – Breakdown of Quebec’s population by mother tongue (%), 1961-2010 
 
 
Sources: Census of Canada (1961-2006) 
 
Figure 7 – Proportion of Quebec’s population speaking both official languages (%), 1961-2010 
 
 
Sources: Census of Canada (1961-2006) 
 
Moving on to the measure of the impact of political instability, we find Dummy_PQt and Index_PQt to be 
statistically significant at a 5% level in all regressions except for equation 6 where Index_PQt is significant 
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at a 10% confidence level. In equation 1, the presence of a Parti Québécois government in power means 
a decrease in net interprovincial migration flows by 8,471 people per year. In equation 3, a PQ 
government is responsible for an annual outflow of 5,778 migrants. When measuring political instability 
with the support for sovereignty index, we note that a 1% increase in the support for sovereignty is 
responsible for the departure of 342 Quebecers per year, in equation 2. If Official_languagest is not one 
of the explicative variables, equation 4, this number goes up to 346 out-migrants per year. We find similar 
figures when using Prais-Winsten estimators. In equation 5, a PQ government is responsible for the 
yearly departure of 6,895 Quebecers and, in equation 6, a 1% increase in the support for sovereignty 
induces annual outflows of 453 people. Thereby, econometric modelling of the factors influencing net 
interprovincial migration flows reveals that political instability has had an impact on Quebec’s population 
in the past 50 years. 
 
Table 4 – Explanatory factors for net migration flows in the Province of Quebec, 1961-2010, 
Francophones as the reference group, different methodologies 
Independent 
variable 
Equation 1 
(Robust 
OLS level) 
Equation 2 
(Robust 
OLS level) 
Equation 3 
(Robust 
OLS level) 
Equation 4 
(Robust 
OLS level) 
Equation 5 
(Robust 
PWE level) 
Equation 6 
(Robust 
PWE level) 
Employmentt 
204,699* 
(0.001) 
265,164* 
(0.000) 
246,813* 
(0.000) 
261,557* 
(0.000) 
291,606* 
(0.002) 
220,970* 
(0.001) 
Earningst 
-19,547 
(0.564) 
-32,839 
(0.322) 
-30,360 
(0.337) 
-31,940 
(0.307) 
-10,585 
(0.832) 
-9.561 
(0.849) 
Anglot 
-416,794* 
(0.035) 
-848,106* 
(0.000) 
-718,123* 
(0.000) 
-806,889* 
(0.000) 
-476,376 
(0.072) 
-812,673* 
(0.004) 
Allot 
-796,637* 
(0.000) 
-661,822* 
(0.000) 
-712,781* 
(0.000) 
-674,177* 
(0.000) 
-734,734* 
0.001) 
-512,364* 
(0.011) 
Official_languagest 
212,203 
(0.060) 
-28,489 
(0.758) 
  
152,200 
(0.406) 
-23,000 
(0.889) 
Dummy_PQt 
-8,471* 
(0.000) 
 
-5,778* 
(0.001) 
 
-6,895* 
(0.024) 
 
Index_PQt  
-342* 
(0.023) 
 
-346* 
(0.021) 
 
-453 
(0.092) 
R
2 
0.78 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.56 0.50 
Notes: N=50; 
P-values are in parenthesis below the estimated coefficients; 
 *Significant coefficients at a 5% confidence level. 
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Conclusion 
All in all, we cannot conclude that either a Parti Québécois government or high support for sovereignty 
have had a negative impact on the Province of Quebec’s economy in the 1966-2010 period, as was 
suggested in the literature. Such arguments are thus supported by anecdotes rather than econometric 
evidence. Indeed, thorough econometric modelling of the province’s main economic indicators has shown 
no significant causal relation between political instability and GDP, employment or investment. However, 
we were able to demonstrate that political instability has had a negative impact on net interprovincial 
migration flows and would be responsible for the departure of several thousands of Quebecers. 
In addition, graphical analysis does not support the popular statement according to which Ontario’s 
economy systematically fares better than Quebec’s. If this might be the case in terms of GDP per capita, 
Quebec’s employment figures have caught up with Ontario’s and no clear picture can be taken for 
investment per capita levels. In this sense, Quebec’s economic performance was not as bad as many 
authors have painted it to be. Nevertheless, a study of interest rates and government borrowing costs 
might reveal a different picture. These two indicators might better capture investors’ nervousness in 
regards to Quebec’s political situation. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table A1 – Relevant data series for the modelling of GDP, employment, investment and interprovincial migration equations, 1961-2010 
Year GDPQC* GDPON* EmploymentQC EmploymentON CapitalQC* CapitalON* BenefitsQC* BenefitsON* InvestmentQC* InvestmentON* 
1961 . . 0.560932 0.630326 . . . . . . 
1962 . . 0.570318 0.634475 . . . . . . 
1963 . . 0.575926 0.640546 . . . . . . 
1964 . . 0.574228 0.651563 . . . . . . 
1965 . . 0.575169 0.642753 . . . . . . 
1966 0.01384 0.018083 0.581535 0.648111 0.032638 0.040078 0.000987 0.001285 0.000901 0.000963 
1967 0.014291 0.018552 0.58341 0.646883 0.033397 0.040991 0.000899 0.001339 0.000682 0.00089 
1968 0.014455 0.019301 0.570121 0.645937 0.033371 0.040854 0.000901 0.001384 0.00059 0.000833 
1969 0.015052 0.02009 0.571145 0.652946 0.034456 0.042085 0.00092 0.001316 0.000493 0.000847 
1970 0.015451 0.02032 0.562665 0.644997 0.035938 0.04406 0.000816 0.001111 0.000542 0.000985 
1971 0.015882 0.020761 0.555209 0.626128 0.037527 0.045147 0.000885 0.001243 0.000661 0.000959 
1972 0.01689 0.021997 0.551957 0.636444 0.039255 0.046566 0.001041 0.001544 0.00074 0.000992 
1973 0.017715 0.02324 0.571952 0.64887 0.041254 0.048766 0.001249 0.001991 0.00086 0.000992 
1974 0.018641 0.024142 0.576821 0.65917 0.045971 0.053353 0.001488 0.002288 0.001048 0.001089 
1975 0.018748 0.023748 0.572431 0.654169 0.049348 0.055223 0.001261 0.00177 0.001413 0.001195 
1976 0.020098 0.025048 0.587127 0.670681 0.050236 0.055663 0.00122 0.001785 0.001237 0.001068 
1977 0.02029 0.024889 0.58223 0.670084 0.051417 0.056277 0.001164 0.001664 0.001212 0.001044 
1978 0.020698 0.024675 0.58626 0.67907 0.052711 0.057124 0.00133 0.00187 0.001166 0.000988 
1979 0.021099 0.025311 0.601668 0.697447 0.054392 0.058865 0.001607 0.002297 0.001185 0.000998 
1980 0.021184 0.025092 0.608908 0.698513 0.056192 0.06046 0.001577 0.002145 0.001113 0.001107 
1981 0.020873 0.025251 0.611231 0.711435 0.05729 0.061259 0.000972 0.00173 0.001117 0.001146 
1982 0.019831 0.023818 0.57443 0.685529 0.056859 0.060575 0.000559 0.00098 0.001043 0.001013 
1983 0.020127 0.024764 0.581504 0.682953 0.056483 0.059925 0.00094 0.001606 0.000827 0.000853 
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1984 0.020977 0.02615 0.595779 0.697681 0.057761 0.060351 0.001146 0.00197 0.000794 0.000953 
1985 0.021481 0.02713 0.611003 0.713685 0.058614 0.061734 0.001223 0.002029 0.000808 0.001028 
1986 0.022362 0.028283 0.625183 0.726407 0.059054 0.062168 0.001137 0.00195 0.000858 0.001139 
1987 0.023237 0.02938 0.638205 0.736852 0.059072 0.06274 0.001486 0.002301 0.000992 0.001271 
1988 0.024293 0.030737 0.646914 0.750814 0.059735 0.063731 0.001834 0.002583 0.001046 0.00139 
1989 0.024083 0.031005 0.649743 0.748565 0.059767 0.063956 0.001469 0.002152 0.001128 0.00144 
1990 0.023487 0.029443 0.647126 0.736037 0.060012 0.063382 0.00085 0.001267 0.001165 0.001264 
1991 0.022288 0.027552 0.631261 0.704309 0.056253 0.05952 0.00048 0.000787 0.000975 0.001091 
1992 0.022273 0.027099 0.619724 0.686364 0.056421 0.059287 0.000404 0.000821 0.000824 0.000919 
1993 0.022268 0.026961 0.615001 0.681919 0.056359 0.059113 0.000571 0.001077 0.000881 0.000734 
1994 0.023238 0.02819 0.624874 0.685331 0.058651 0.061269 0.001191 0.001839 0.000775 0.000656 
1995 0.023574 0.028862 0.630148 0.689661 0.05953 0.061899 0.001363 0.002089 0.00072 0.000629 
1996 0.023523 0.028813 0.626901 0.691296 0.06073 0.062906 0.001216 0.001949 0.000697 0.000763 
1997 0.024072 0.029745 0.632478 0.698501 0.062391 0.064483 0.001182 0.001895 0.000698 0.000828 
1998 0.024769 0.030615 0.647019 0.71082 0.0644 0.066598 0.001331 0.002009 0.000777 0.00084 
1999 0.026051 0.032174 0.657144 0.723987 0.065016 0.067234 0.001759 0.002421 0.000726 0.00093 
2000 0.026937 0.033238 0.668044 0.733431 0.065719 0.068294 0.001605 0.002427 0.000818 0.000832 
2001 0.026904 0.032764 0.671077 0.731068 0.066252 0.06828 0.001709 0.002356 0.000797 0.000808 
2002 0.027267 0.033205 0.690487 0.730012 0.066408 0.067284 0.001724 0.003114 0.000811 0.000821 
2003 0.027389 0.032933 0.696634 0.740609 0.064094 0.065479 0.001298 0.002745 0.000852 0.000798 
2004 0.027984 0.033429 0.701514 0.740708 0.064402 0.065656 0.001565 0.002679 0.000951 0.000818 
2005 0.028186 0.033694 0.701277 0.737193 0.064759 0.065702 0.001474 0.002614 0.000879 0.000845 
2006 0.028497 0.034073 0.703951 0.736363 0.06527 0.066522 0.001616 0.00259 0.000933 0.000931 
2007 0.02901 0.034403 0.716226 0.740759 0.065603 0.067492 0.001539 0.002607 0.00104 0.001031 
2008 0.028929 0.033427 0.720408 0.743506 0.067861 0.070081 0.001501 0.002454 0.001087 0.001033 
2009 0.028602 0.032677 0.709712 0.717511 0.069889 0.070889 0.001091 0.001948 0.001051 0.000923 
2010 0.029126 0.033394 0.717407 0.720484 0.068829 0.069227 . . 0.001086 0.000898 
*per capita in million dollars of 1992 
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Table A1 (Continued) - Relevant data series for the modelling of GDP, employment, investment and interprovincial migration equations, 1961-2010 
Year Migration EarningsQC* EarningsON* Franco Anglo Allo Official_languages Dummy_PQ Index_PQ* Dummybreak1 Dummybreak2 
1961 2320 384.1159 406.7846 0.77644 0.145189 0.013561 0.254578 0 7.67 0 0 
1962 3159 392.9121 414.1181 0.779529 0.143757 0.018385 0.256722 0 8 0 0 
1963 -6577 400.3725 421.2975 0.782619 0.142324 0.023209 0.258866 0 7.67 0 0 
1964 -6219 408.9148 428.7931 0.785708 0.140892 0.028033 0.261011 0 7.33 0 0 
1965 -7674 420.7235 441.8388 0.788797 0.13946 0.032857 0.263155 0 7 0 0 
1966 -15109 432.5246 447.165 0.791886 0.138028 0.037681 0.265299 0 7.23 0 0 
1967 -15128 446.5741 460.8167 0.794975 0.136595 0.042505 0.267444 0 8.5 0 0 
1968 -18480 457.2436 474.0589 0.798065 0.135163 0.047329 0.269588 0 10 0 0 
1969 -28368 466.594 486.2 0.801154 0.133731 0.052153 0.271732 0 11 0 0 
1970 -41156 480.0468 508.5342 0.804243 0.132298 0.056977 0.273877 0 22 0 0 
1971 -25005 503.5019 537.6925 0.807332 0.130866 0.061802 0.276021 0 16 0 0 
1972 -19891 519.7148 555.5752 0.80592 0.130379 0.060157 0.280843 0 10 0 0 
1973 -14730 521.3802 551.9402 0.804508 0.129891 0.058513 0.285665 0 17 0 0 
1974 -11852 527.8426 546.0401 0.803096 0.129403 0.056869 0.290487 0 15 1 0 
1975 -12340 548.2881 555.7941 0.801683 0.128916 0.055225 0.295308 0 15 1 0 
1976 -22231 569.2137 577.0402 0.800271 0.128428 0.053581 0.30013 0 15 1 0 
1977 -38498 581.0703 583.7364 0.805027 0.124564 0.056232 0.304952 1 27.56 1 0 
1978 -36955 572.4004 566.8382 0.809783 0.1207 0.058884 0.309774 1 28.92 1 0 
1979 -30306 566.8675 561.541 0.814539 0.116836 0.061536 0.314596 1 32.43 1 0 
1980 -25684 571.4395 556.3305 0.819295 0.112972 0.064188 0.319418 1 37.06 1 0 
1981 -22707 566.7499 552.8915 0.824051 0.109108 0.06684 0.32424 1 34.5 1 0 
1982 -27556 561.4264 547.3808 0.822026 0.105045 0.065527 0.327567 1 32.11 1 0 
1983 -21028 579.5171 566.7624 0.82 0.100981 0.064213 0.330894 1 25.12 1 1 
1984 -11175 576.3431 570.8028 0.817975 0.096918 0.062899 0.334221 1 22.85 1 1 
1985 -6876 569.4749 574.7317 0.815949 0.092855 0.061586 0.337548 1 24.5 0 1 
1986 -2211 559.8119 577.0602 0.813924 0.088792 0.060272 0.340875 0 25.94 0 1 
1987 -6448 559.0464 579.0822 0.814307 0.088629 0.065251 0.343563 0 27.39 0 1 
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1988 -6878 562.845 585.8585 0.81469 0.088466 0.070229 0.34625 0 28.83 0 1 
1989 -9209 556.8978 590.2409 0.815073 0.088303 0.075207 0.348938 0 36.7 0 1 
1990 -9029 561.208 587.2266 0.815456 0.088139 0.080186 0.351626 0 52.42 0 1 
1991 -12300 553.7563 584.599 0.815839 0.087976 0.085164 0.354314 0 49.69 0 1 
1992 -9785 566.03 598.6 0.81449 0.087029 0.086799 0.358982 0 45.43 0 1 
1993 -7426 562.5049 601.277 0.813142 0.086082 0.088434 0.363649 0 41.57 0 1 
1994 -10252 564.1765 615.6078 0.811793 0.085135 0.090069 0.368317 0 38.98 0 1 
1995 -10248 556.0557 608.4069 0.810445 0.084188 0.091704 0.372985 1 41.72 0 1 
1996 -15358 552.899 613.1256 0.809097 0.08324 0.093339 0.377652 1 44.17 0 1 
1997 -17559 552.3141 616.6357 0.809753 0.08265 0.094583 0.383735 1 41.8 0 1 
1998 -14512 554.4843 619.2634 0.810409 0.082059 0.095827 0.389817 1 38.6 0 1 
1999 -11712 548.181 618.6244 0.811065 0.081468 0.097072 0.3959 1 39.11 0 1 
2000 -11233 542.9515 616.7577 0.811721 0.080877 0.098316 0.401982 1 38.14 0 1 
2001 -7089 535.1117 597.5 0.812377 0.080286 0.09956 0.408065 1 37.67 0 1 
2002 -3095 536.5546 597.2521 0.80799 0.079709 0.103486 0.407622 1 37.88 0 1 
2003 -221 536.4432 595.4456 0.803603 0.079133 0.107412 0.407179 0 38.91 0 1 
2004 -2972 540.1605 600.947 0.799217 0.078556 0.111338 0.406736 0 42.24 0 1 
2005 -7156 546.1351 609.7329 0.79483 0.07798 0.115264 0.406294 0 45.03 0 1 
2006 -11828 545.1116 607.0978 0.79 0.077403 0.119189 0.405851 0 41.42 0 1 
2007 -12675 556.315 617.1289 0.785333 0.077302 0.121892 0.405638 0 37.77 0 1 
2008 -9707 553.704 617.187 0.780222 0.077201 0.124595 0.405425 0 37 0 1 
2009 -4247 558.3554 623.4581 0.775111 0.077101 0.127297 0.405213 0 37 0 1 
2010 -4348 564.982 636.0562 0.77 0.077 0.13 0.405 0 37 0 1 
*in dollars of 1992 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Table A2 – Sources for data series 
Data Sources 
Gross domestic product CANSIM 384-0035 (1966-1980), 384-0001 (1981-2010) 
Consumer price index CANSIM 326-0021 (1961-2010) 
Employment 
CANSIM 384-0035 (1966-1975), 282-0002 (1976-2010), Labour 
Force Survey (1961-1965) 
Population 15-64 CANSIM 051-0026 (1966-1970), 051-0001 (1971-2010) 
Total population CANSIM 051-0026 (1966-1970), 051-0001 (1971-2010) 
Fixed capital stocks CANSIM 031-0004 (1966-2010) 
Non-residential private 
investment 
CANSIM 384-0015 (1966-1980), 384-0002 (1981-2010) 
Corporations’ profits before taxes CANSIM 384-0014 (1966-1980), 384-0001 (1981-2010) 
Direct corporate taxes CANSIM 384-0022 (1966-1980), 384-0004 (1981-2009) 
Interprovincial migration flows CANSIM 051-0017 (1961-2010) 
Average weekly income 
CANSIM 281-0021 (1961-1985), 281-0006 (1983-2000), 281-0027 
(1991-2010) 
Mother tongue Census of Canada (1961-2006) 
Knowledge of official languages Census of Canada (1961-2006) 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Table A3 – Explanatory factors for the Quebec-Ontario GDP ratio, 1966-2010, different methodologies 
Independent 
variable 
Equation 1 
(Robust 
OLS level) 
Equation 2 
(OLS level) 
Equation 3 
(OLS level) 
Equation 4 
(OLS level) 
Equation 5 
(PWE level) 
Equation 6 
(PWE level) 
Equation 7 
(OLS 1
st
 diff) 
Equation 8 
(OLS 1
st
 diff) 
lnEmploymentt 
0.298* 
(0.005) 
0.235* 
(0.009) 
0.494* 
(0.000) 
0.498* 
(0.000) 
0.169 
(0.301) 
0.152 
(0.321) 
0.089 
(0.619) 
0.087 
(0.620) 
lnCapitalt 
0.395* 
(0.000) 
0.451* 
(0.000) 
0.378* 
(0.000) 
0.262* 
(0.000) 
0.492* 
(0.015) 
0.462* 
(0.020) 
0.391 
(0.090) 
0.378 
(0.086) 
Dummy_PQt 
0.011 
(0.191) 
 
-0.001 
(0.802) 
 
-0.004 
(0.582) 
 
-0.003 
(0.606) 
 
Index_PQt  
-0.000 
(0.920) 
 
0.001* 
(0.028) 
 
0.001 
(0.163) 
 
0.001 
(0.164) 
Dummybreak1t   
0.040* 
(0.000) 
0.044* 
(0.000) 
    
R
2 
0.73 0.72 0.86 0.87 0.24 0.25 0.08 0.12 
Notes: N=45; 
* Significant coefficients at a 5% confidence level; 
P-values are in parenthesis below the estimated coefficients; 
Equations are specified as: 
-Equation 1: Robust OLS in levels, PQt = Dummy_PQt; 
-Equation 2: OLS in levels, PQt = Index_PQt; 
-Equation 3: OLS in levels, PQt = Dummy_PQt, with Dummybreak1t; 
-Equation 4: OLS in levels, PQt = Index_PQt, with Dummybreak1t; 
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-Equation 5: Robust PWE in levels, PQt = Dummy_PQt; 
-Equation 6: PWE in levels, PQt = Index_PQt; 
-Equation 7: OLS in first differences, PQt = Dummy_PQt; 
-Equation 8: OLS in first differences, PQt = Index_PQt. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Table A4 – Explanatory factors for the Quebec-Ontario investment ratio, 1966-2010, different 
methodologies 
Independent variable 
Equation 1 
(OLS level) 
Equation 2 
(Robust 
OLS level) 
Equation 3 
(PWE level) 
Equation 4 
(Robust 
PWE level) 
Equation 5 
(OLS 1
st
 diff) 
Equation 6 
(OLS 1
st
 diff) 
lnBenefitst-1 
-0.031 
(0.900) 
-0.070 
(0.732) 
-0.314 
(0.081) 
-0.316* 
(0.043) 
-0.116 
(0.483) 
-0.133 
(0.431) 
lnGDPt-1 
3.700* 
(0.000) 
3.690* 
(0.000) 
3.082* 
(0.004) 
3.070* 
(0.006) 
2.975* 
(0.031) 
2.901* 
(0.036) 
Dummy_PQt 
-0.019 
(0.721) 
 
-0.002 
(0.971) 
 
-0.028 
(0.628) 
 
Index_PQt  
-0.001 
(0.805) 
 
0.000 
*0.960) 
 
0.000 
(0.951) 
R
2 
0.49 0.49 0.25 0.25 0.12 0.11 
Notes: N=44; 
*Significant coefficients at a 5% confidence level; 
P-values are in parenthesis below the estimated coefficients; 
Equations are specified as: 
-Equation 1: OLS in levels, PQt = Dummy_PQt; 
-Equation 2: Robust OLS in levels, PQt = Index_PQt; 
-Equation 3: Prais-Winsten estimators (PWE) in levels, PQt = Dummy_PQt; 
-Equation 4: Robust PWE in levels, PQt = Index_PQt; 
-Equation 5: OLS in first differences, PQt = Dummy_PQt; 
-Equation 6: OLS in first differences, PQt = Index_PQt. 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
Figure A1 - Difference in employment rates between Ontario and Quebec (%), 1966-2010 
 
Sources: employment: CANSIM 384-0035 (1966-1975), 282-0002 (1976-2010); 
population 15-64: 051-0026 (1966-1970), 051-0001 (1971-2010) 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
Figure A2 – Quebec-Ontario ratio of employment, 1966-2010 
 
Sources: employment: CANSIM 384-0035 (1966-1975), 282-0002 (1976-2010); 
total population: 051-0026 (1966-1970), 051-0001 (1971-2010) 
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